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One of the teasing characteristics of novels soused in literariness, like J.M. 
Coetzee‟s, is their tendency to leak, to bleed, into vast inchoate terrains of 
intertextuality. Trails of significance proliferate seemingly without end. The 
reader is constantly challenged to measure and assess their implications within 
or against the frail containing form of the story, much as Russian formalism 
taught us to keep sujet and fable in perpetual dialogue. However, it has become 
apparent that in all the dense thickets of commentary occasioned by Coetzee‟s 
most controversial novel, Disgrace (1999), insufficient attention has been paid 
to the intertextual implications of David Lurie‟s learning, his scholarly 
preoccupations. In what follows, the status of the argument presented, which is 
concerned more with understanding than with evaluation, is debatable, perhaps 
even undecidable. Part intellectual background, part intertextual commentary, it 
comes closest to being a discussion of some of the things the character David 
Lurie might want us to think about, were he in a position to know that we are 
engaged in reading Disgrace.  
 
Unless the reader attempts this kind of exploration, two of the most vexed 
issues freighting the novel‟s central fabulation: Lucy‟s curiously stoical, 
impassive response to her rape, together with her decision to stay on in South 
Africa; and David Lurie‟s sudden, seemingly inexplicable care for the doomed 
dogs, from their last moments at the animal shelter until he lovingly consigns 
their corpses to the incinerator, must remain opaque. In particular, the final 
words of the novel, “Yes, I am giving him up” (220), uttered in relation to the 
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immanent “Lösung” of the little dog Bev Shaw calls Driepoot, will tend to 
taunt the reader, rather than illuminate.  
 
Let us plunge straight into a particular train of enquiry: the matter of the 
intellectual history or genealogy supplied for the central focalising figure of 
David Lurie. Evidence comes principally from skimpy but precise gestures 
towards his various scholarly projects, past and present – a neat way of 
indicating an intellectual prologue and trajectory, without turning the text into a 
novel of ideas. 
 
We learn that his first book was a study of Arrigo Boito‟s opera Mefistofele 
(1868, rev. 1875). Two facts about this particular project seem relevant. First, 
Mefistofele is based on Goethe‟s Faust (both parts of the poem – Boito wrote 
his own libretto); and second, it is the only opera Boito ever managed to 
complete. His magnum opus was also his solum opus. Pronounced a failure 
when it opened, seven years later a revised version enjoyed considerable 
success. Thereafter Boito laboured unsuccessfully for fifty-four years to 
complete a second opera. Apparently deserted by his operatic muse, he 
nevertheless established an enviable reputation as a writer of libretti, Verdi‟s 
Otello being his masterpiece. It may be no coincidence that David Lurie‟s 
chamber opera remains immured in words (as far as the reader of Disgrace is 
concerned) and that much of Coetzee‟s own work comprises metatextual re-
fictionalisation of canonical texts. Lurie‟s study is called Boito and the Faust 
Legend: The Genesis of Mefistofele (4). As a fable the Faust story – the ancient 
German story-complex in which a magician imperils his soul in his pursuit of 
knowledge, power and sensual satisfaction – presides over the life and career of 
David Lurie, as perhaps it does over scholarly and scientific pursuits in general.  
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The question to which we must return is Why opera? Why music? Wouldn‟t 
Goethe‟s poem have sufficed? 
  
His next venture is entitled The Vision of Richard of St Victor, in which David 
Lurie becomes preoccupied with one of the most important scholastic 
discussions of mystical transcendence. One passage from Richard (d. 1173) 
might still today be regarded as public property, as sufficiently well known to 
be recognized by non-specialist readers, and it comes from his work called The 
Twelve Patriarchs (also known as the Benjamin Minor): 
 
The full knowledge of a rational spirit is a mountain great and high. This 
mountain transcends the highest point of all mundane knowledges; from 
the height it looks down upon all philosophy, all knowledge of the 
world. What so excellent did Aristotle or Plato discover; what so 
excellent was a crowd of philosophers able to discover? - - - He who 
arrives at perfect knowledge of himself takes possession of the summit 
of the mountain.  
(trans. Zinn, 133) 
 
The visionary project of summiting the mountain of self-knowledge marks the 
first phase of Lurie‟s scholarly odyssey in the footsteps of Faust/Mefistofeles. 
Richard of St. Victor‟s major work is The Mystical Ark or Benjamin Major, 
known to literary scholars mainly as the basis of the mystical psychology of 
Dante‟s Paradiso. In it Richard depicts the soul ascending through various 
stages of contemplation; through reason, imagination, and understanding, 
gradually relinquishing all sensible objects of thought, until finally it 
contemplates that which surpasses reason, and may even be beside or contrary 
to reason. This is the condition of mentis alienato, or ecstasy, in which all 
memory of the present leaves the mind and simple, direct contemplation of 
truth is attained. In Richard of St Victor‟s version, this is the high mountain of 
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ecstatic contemplation upon which Christ is transfigured, and one of the key 
moments in which the philosophy of Plato becomes assimilated to the teaching 
of the Gospels. Lurie studies it under the rubric of “eros as vision” (4). 
 
Lurie‟s subsequent book, we are told, was a study called Wordsworth and the 
Burden of the Past. The title gestures to a famous short work by Walter Jackson 
Bate, entitled The Burden of the Past and the English Poet (1970). In post-
apartheid South Africa, and in Disgrace, the past is an ethical and political 
burden in a particular sense, one deeply felt by David Lurie and his daughter. 
But it is also, and in a correlated way, a burden felt directly in the defining 
problem of the romantic poet (and, perhaps, the post-apartheid white writer) as 
expressed by Bate, “What is there left to do?” (3).  
 
Bate‟s book was very influential, not least in the reading – or strong mis-
reading – to which it gave rise in the work of Harold Bloom, who has spent 
much of his scholarly life exploring the condition of romantic belatedness, the 
feeling of having arrived after all the big statements have been made, yet 
needing desperately to be original in order to neutralize the „anxiety of 
influence‟ (see The Anxiety of Influence, 1973). To escape this condition, the 
romantics resort to complex archaeologies of the self, and a deep preoccupation 
with responding adequately to the present moment, sporting an overt fictive 
reliance on fidelity to actual, present experience. We see something like the 
kernel of this project and its problems in the vignette presented of David 
Lurie‟s university class on Book 6 of The Prelude, where we encounter another 
mountain: 
 „From a bare ridge,‟ he reads aloud, 
 
      we also first beheld 
  Unveiled the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved 
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  To have a soulless image on the eye 
That had usurped upon a living thought 
That never more could be. 
          (21) 
 
He trails his uncomprehending students through the distinction between „usurp‟ 
and „usurp upon‟: “Usurp, to take over entirely, is the perfective of usurp upon; 
usurping completes the act of usurping upon” (21). This apparently 
inconsequential poetic moment presents a fleeting feeling of grief and 
estrangement accompanying the realization that human perception is absolutely 
limited by the perceptual apparatus of the physical body. Such a moment marks 
a distinct step towards that philosophical egoism which later metamorphosed 
into the massive egotism seen in romantic individualism – notably 
exemplified in the figure of Byron. In philosophical terms, this Mont Blanc 
episode gestures towards the Kantian revolution which prepared the way for 
romanticism, in a sense underwriting its entire discourse. 
 
Kant had proposed and defended radically new limits for what can and cannot 
be known by human beings. He confined knowledge to the sphere of actual or 
possible experience, to the empirical and conceptual deliverances of human 
sensibility and its mental and technological extensions. Whatever we know, we 
can know only according to our physiological and mental make-up as human 
beings. That there are other forms of sensibility (as in other life forms, dogs, for 
example) we cannot doubt. Similarly, that there is a reality beyond the reach of 
our own perceptual and conceptual apparatus we cannot doubt. But whatever its 
nature, this reality must remain permanently inaccessible. 
 
Dismayed, though hardly surprised, by his class‟s failure to experience any 
“flash of revelation” concerning the Mont Blanc passage (21), David Lurie 
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spells out some of its implications. (I interpolate comments to flesh out the bare 
bones of this sketch.): 
„ - - - Wordsworth seems to be feeling his way towards a balance: 
not the pure idea, wreathed in clouds [in other words, not the 
immediate mystical self-apprehension seen in Richard of St. 
Victor, the beatific vision], nor the visual image burned upon the 
retina, overwhelming and disappointing us with its matter-of-fact 
clarity [i.e. not the „reality‟ delivered by empiricism, and 
exemplified in the realist novel], but the sense-image, kept as 
fleeting as possible, as a means towards stirring or activating the 
idea that lies buried more deeply in the soil of memory.‟ 
     (22) 
   
The passage posits the coming together, the interaction and fleeting integration, 
of subject and object, noumenon and phenomena, in the act of perception – an 
act completed by the stimulation or re-awakening of aboriginal memories of a 
Platonic reality through the process called anamnesis. What Kant ruled out as 
necessarily impossible, namely knowledge of that which is beyond the 
possibility of experience by human beings, the romantic poets clung to with 
wistful determination.    
 
The Mont Blanc passage also enacts the major philosophical equivocation of 
the Kantian revolution, a flaw so patent that subsequent generations have 
marveled that so astute a thinker could ever have made it. The soulless image, 
we are told, “usurps upon” a living thought “that never more can be”: in other 
words there is here a vestigial awareness of two entities, not one: the percept 
and the „thing-in-itself‟. This corresponds to the contradictory Kantian assertion 
that our perceptions are caused by noumena of which they are the appearance, 
when all the while the deeper implication of the Kantian revolution should be 
that noumena are ultimately unknowable because permanently shrouded by the 
deliverances of human sensibility. We know phenomena only as mediated by 
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our own forms of perception and intellection, and so phenomena are all we 
know. The second phase of Lurie‟s intellectual odyssey has here found its 
crisis. 
 
David Lurie‟s current preoccupation is Byron, specifically Byron‟s relationship 
with Contessa Teresa Guiccioli, among the more equable and significant of his 
embroglios with women (a judgment sustained even in current biography – see 
MacCarthy 355). The fullest account of the relationship is to be found in Iris 
Origo‟s book, The Last Attachment (1949), and of course in the Byron Letters. I 
suspect, however, though it might be difficult to prove, that Coetzee‟s interest 
in Byron and Teresa was nurtured particularly, not by Iris Origo, but by the 
second volume of Peter Quennell‟s popular biography, Byron in Italy (1941), a 
work which did much to stimulate mid-twentieth century interest in Byron‟s 
life. The book is very well written, perhaps not the least of its attractions for 
Coetzee, and it supplies the putative title for David Lurie‟s intended musical 
composition, “Byron in Italy, a meditation on love between the sexes in the 
form of a chamber opera” (4). 
 
Following two years of sexual indulgence in Venice, in 1819 Byron took up 
with the young wife of Count Guiccioli, an affair which he decided was to be 
his “last love” (see Quennell 157). This is the relationship David Lurie sets 
himself to celebrate in his chamber opera – the double entendre is deliberate. 
Teresa was eighteen (186), Count Guiccioli sixty and on his third marriage. The 
two had been married barely a year when Byron intervened to adopt – rather to 
his own surprise – the traditional role of the cavaliere servente, the lover who is 
tolerated by the husband provided decorum is observed. Most commentators on 
Byron‟s function in the novel simply note that Lurie‟s disgrace at the 
University and his departure for Salem parallel Byron‟s flight to Italy in the 
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wake of his murky transgressions in England (see 15). True, but deeply 
inadequate. The plebian equivalent of Byron‟s Teresa in Lurie‟s life, the 
person, the arrangement, by which he claims to have solved what he calls “the 
problem of sex” (1), is the prostitute Soraya. Byron imperiled his relation with 
Teresa, the woman with whom he briefly came near to achieving some kind of 
equilibrium, when, on a visit to Bologna from Ravenna, the two scarpered to 
Byron‟s house in Venice on their own, thereby impugning the honour of her 
husband (see, for example, Quennell 160-61). David Lurie similarly destroys 
his convenient arrangement with Soraya when he attempts to invade her social 
world, having spied her out walking with her children and then seeing them 
eating together at Captain Dorego‟s in St. George‟s Street (6). He even employs 
a private detective to track her down (9). In both cases, a primarily sexual 
relationship, subterranean, unofficially tolerated but morally dubious, is forced 
into the open social world through impetuosity and scorn for public convention. 
 
The implicit comparison between Byron, that grand European figure of scandal 
and taboo, and the insipid persona of David Lurie is both deliberately ludicrous 
and completely cogent. A suggestive passage from Quennell‟s Byron in Italy 
throws light on the juxtaposition: 
- - - if moral standards are to be invoked (which, when we are dealing 
with Byron, proves very often an awkward and ineffectual business), as 
much disgrace attaches to escapades entered without love, affection and, 
in many instances, without real desire, as to a passion that engrosses the 
faculties of mind and soul.     
                                                (168) 
 
The relevance here may be purely adventitious, but its import is not. Lurie‟s 
sexual encounters in the novel are many and varied, but none rises above the 
banal. Byron‟s, in contrast, were often markedly zestful, even it could be said, 
euphoric. The choice of adjective is deliberate. In Goethe‟s Faust (Part Two), 
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Byron surfaces unexpectedly in the figure of Euphorion, the allegorized 
offspring of Faust and Helen of Troy, their relationship supposedly 
symbolizing a hoped-for rapprochment between the romantic and classical 
ideals. (Think if you will of a fusion between the native visionary energies of 
Richard of St Victor – a synthesis of classical and mystical traditions – and 
Wordsworth‟s struggle to both escape and celebrate the confinements of the 
ego – the romantic problematic.) The figure of Helen, supposed „cause‟ of the 
siege of Troy, whose beauty „launched a thousand ships‟, exemplifies a long 
tradition in which defense of female sexuality stands for the protective powers 
of civilization. As walled enclaves subject to siege, assault and occupation, the 
city‟s conquest or defeat is regularly troped in western literature, both classical 
and romantic, as sexual possession – as the raping and pillaging that follows 
martial triumph. The rape of women signals the collapse of civility. In Salem 
(the very name unavoidably conjures stray associations with the 1692 witch 
trials in Massachusetts and notions of preserving a delusory peace) there 
actually is no need to breach defensive physical walls. Lucy willingly 
cooperates with Petrus, not sexually, but in terms of his ownership plans. Later, 
even after the gang rape, his symbolic irrigation pipes enter the African soil 
with her consent and support (139). Rape is always gratuitous from an ethical 
point of view, but here especially so. Lucy understands its aim to be 
“subjugation” (159). It is no accident that Lurie wants to put into Byron‟s 
mouth Aeneas‟s desolate words before Dido‟s fresco at Carthage depicting the 
destruction of Troy: Sunt lacrimae rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt (162): 
„tears are shed for things even here and our mortal ways touch the soul‟.  
 
In Goethe‟s poem Faust wins Helen, not through romantic persuasion or 
classical negotiation, but through powers of magical, supernatural intervention. 
She is one reward in his pact with Mefistofeles, part of Faust‟s egocentric 
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fantasy. And the offspring of this fantasy-brought-to life is the boy Euphorion, 
Goethe‟s critique of Byron.1     
 
Like his real-life counterpart, even perhaps like David Lurie, Euphorion proves 
a very troublesome lad, and his unmanageable-ness centres on his errant 
sexuality, his freedom from restraint, as we see in this climactic episode (cited 
here in the Wayne translation): 
  Euphorion (bearing a young girl). 
   Here I drag the little courser, 
   And to joy of mine will force her: 
   Now with rapture and with zest 
   Press I her unwilling breast, 
   Kiss her rebel mouth, that so 
   She my will and strength may know. 
       (Faust Part Two, Act 3, 205) 
 
This unconscionable rape destroys the idyllic relationship between Faust and 
Helen (any potential rapprochement between classical and romantic 
aspirations) and Euphorion dies like Icarus, attempting impossible flight, 
striving to transcend gendered sexuality through rampant indulgence.  
 
The basso profundo of Disgrace is that thanks to powerful biological drives 
expressed as sexuality (and whatever lies behind those drives), we all live 
subject to a state of potential disgrace, a disgrace servants of eros – those who 
yield to impulse, like Byron and David Lurie – evade mainly by chance: 
  
He stood a stranger in this breathing world, 
An erring spirit from another hurled; 
A thing of dark imaginings, that shaped 
By choice the perils he by chance escaped. 
      (32) 
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This is Lurie teaching Byron‟s Lara, with Melanie and her boyfriend in front of 
him in the class, just as the scandal is about to break over the Cape Technical 
University. (Melanie is a Gretchen figure, in terms of Goethe‟s poem.) The 
sense of fundamental alienation, of originating somewhere else, of a source 
beyond “this breathing world” is very strong. Byron never escaped his Calvinist 
upbringing, and the concepts of unattainable grace, original sin, and fallen 
angels form a constant backdrop to his poetry. But Byron‟s conception of the 
human situation goes beyond conventional Christian notions of the battle 
between spirit and flesh, beyond even Sidney‟s “erect wit” and “infected will” 
(Apology 9), as we see in the next excerpt from “Lara” that Coetzee has David 
Lurie ventriloquise for us: 
 
He could 
At times resign his own for others‟ good, 
But not in pity, not because he ought, 
But in some strange perversity of thought,  
That swayed him onward with a secret pride 
To do what few or none would do beside; 
And this same impulse would in tempting time 
Mislead his spirit equally to crime. 
        (33) 
 
Here we reach the crux of the Byronic hero‟s plight, be it Lara, Childe Harold, 
Manfred or even Don Juan (31): “dark imaginings” shape his conduct, and the 
impulse that unaccountably informs his acts of virtue is the same impulse that 
can and does “Mislead his spirit equally to crime”. As Lurie puts it, “He 
doesn‟t act on principle but on impulse, and the source of his impulses is dark 
to him” (33).  
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We have traveled a long way from Richard of St Victor. “Vision as eros” (4) 
has become eros as vision. During his disciplinary hearing at the University, 
Lurie explains his actions to the committee as follows: 
„I was not myself. I was no longer a fifty-year-old divorcé at a 
loose end. I became a servant of Eros.‟ 
  „Is this a defence you are offering us? Ungovernable impulse? 
„It is not a defence. You want a confession, I give you a 
confession. As for the impulse, it was far from ungovernable. I 
have denied similar impulses many times in the past, I am 
ashamed to say.‟ 
    (52) 
 
This, the first of two occasions where Lurie describes himself as “a servant of 
eros”,2 reflects much more than mere Wildean savoir faire.3 The expression is 
not simply a fey euphemism for mundane sexual urges. Eros is more 
fundamental and inclusive even than modern tropologies centred on the notion 
of „desire‟ might suggest. For instance, we should recall that in Thucydides a 
powerful eros sends the Athenians on their fateful expedition to Sicily, a 
venture which eventually precipitates the collapse of Athens in the 
Peloponnesian war (404 BCE) and the end of classical Greek civilization. Eros 
in ancient Greek poetry is an overwhelmingly powerful but temporary impulse, 
what renaissance psychologists would later term an „Affection‟,4 one that takes 
away an individual‟s better judgment and sense of independence. This surging, 
disruptive invasion of external energy, hints at a disgrace deeper than social or 
legal disgrace; a generic disgrace that troubles Lurie, Byron and I suspect, at 
some level, J.M. Coetzee; and it has to do with the power of an external force 
(„eros‟) to suborn the human will, indeed to become that will – and with 
society‟s inability to accommodate or even acknowledge this predicament. At 
various times, he is led to desperate ponderings on the possibility of self-
castration (as in the historical instance of Origen – see 9), or concern for the 
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plight of the next-door dog at his marital home in Kenilworth, beaten savagely 
by its owners for copulatory urges for which it is hardly responsible (90). He 
wants in some way to speak up for “the rights of desire” (89). 
 
Such is the naïve yet disturbing substance behind Lurie‟s admission to the 
disciplinary hearing. Immediately prior to the second passage from Lara that 
Lurie reads out from Byron‟s poem, we find Lara attempting some self-
analysis: 
 
    In wild reflection o‟er his stormy life;    330 
But haughty still, and loth himself to blame, 
He called on nature‟s self to share the shame, 
And charged all fault upon the fleshly form 
She gave to clog the soul, and feast the worm; 
‟Till he at last confounded good and ill,             335 
And half mistook for fate the acts of will; 
 
To confound intentional acts with the promptings of fate, to feel impelled to act 
on impulses whose origins are dark to one, to feel that the same inscrutable 
force external to one‟s being impels acts that are good and acts that are bad, or 
even acts that are both good and bad (depending on how one looks at them): 
this is the predicament shared by Byron and David Lurie and it marks the third 
stage of his intellectual odyssey, the crisis with which the narrative of Disgrace 
opens and to which his earlier intellectual explorations had been merely the 
prologue. 
 
Elizabeth Lowry has correctly described the novel as an „anti-pastoral‟ (12), 
meaning, I think, that the elaborately constructed parallels between town and 
country, Cape Town and Salem, the university world of intellect and the rural, 
ländliche one of practice, the artful/artless rape of Melanie versus the 
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artless/artful rape of Lucy – in fact the entire meaning-generating potential of 
the pastoral complex – is here rendered inert, neutral. The traditional coinage is 
deployed, but its symbolic value has been scuppered by flattening all tension, 
and most hermeneutical differentiation between the two locales. Town and 
country suffer under the same uniform ontological dispensation.5   
 
Confronted with his social disgrace, with his inability to protect his daughter, 
with his declining sexual attractiveness – and as a scholar of Goethe‟s Faust – 
David Lurie ought, typically, to apply the routine romantic remedy which, in all 
its belatedness and ambiguity, comes in the form of the doctrine of entsagen, or 
renunciation, a teaching most closely associated with Goethe. This he 
deliberately refuses to do (the final „blow-job‟ from the prostitute on the slopes 
of Signal Hill underlines the point – see 194). 
 
Entsagen might be described as the curbing of eros in both its intellectual and 
sensual dimensions. Such a response, according to Max Weber‟s Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5), underlay much of the social energy 
manifested in nineteenth century industrial-capitalist development. It was also 
Carlyle‟s answer to the Kantian revolution, borrowed from Novalis and Goethe 
and elaborated in his extraordinary prose fantasia Sartor Resartus (1833). 
“Close thy Byron; open thy Goethe” (Sartor Resartus, Book 2, chap. 9): this 
celebrated pronouncement of Carlyle‟s, though never quoted in the novel, 
hovers over Disgrace much as it did over mid-Victorian Britain, expressing 
what Lionel Trilling called “the manifest ruling intention of the age” (56). In 
South African terms, and for David Lurie in particular, entsagen might be seen 
as all too reminiscent of Calvinist puritanism, a rejection of voluptas closely 
related to the po-faced apartheid dissembling which disguised moral corruption 
of the most insidious kind. 
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Entsagen involves deliberate renunciation, self-abnegation, an acknowledgment 
and acceptance of limitation. In Goethe‟s version it issues in the attainment of 
Olympian detachment; in those of Novalis and Carlyle, the relinquishment of 
excessive self-consciousness. At one level, the doctrine is indeed a response to 
the post-Kantian predicament: the mind is forced to abandon the possibility of 
intellectual certainty, of unbounded knowledge, and becomes aware of its 
limitations and subject to increasing self-consciousness. This is a curbing of 
Faustian eros in its intellectual dimension. But at a deeper level, there is always 
a sexual accompaniment. 
 
For the German romantics and Carlyle, the entsagen teaching typically follows 
a failed romance, in literature as in life. In the case of Goethe the doctrine was a 
belated response to a tepid physical relationship with his intellectual friend and 
companion Charlotte von Stein, during the busy Weimar years in government, 
between 1775 and 1786. On a visit to Italy away from her he underwent a sharp 
sensual awakening, followed by a troubling recognition of the heartless egoism 
of the sensualist, and returned to poor Charlotte espousing the doctrine of 
renunciation – a teaching important in all his later writings including, not least, 
his account of the Faust legend. Novalis invented his version of entsagen after 
the loss of his youthful love Sophie; Carlyle‟s Diogenes Teufelsdröckh in 
Sartor Resartus discovers the „Everlasting Yea‟ following the failure of his 
affair with Blumine. 
 
But David Lurie‟s renunciation (if, indeed, it can be described as such) is 
precipitated not by failure of a particular relationship, as with his nineteenth 
century romantic precursors – Lurie in fact seems markedly unmoved by 
women as people – but by memories of the sensual specificity of his lovers (of 
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Melanie at this particular moment) together with an intense awareness of his 
own declining sexual attractiveness. It is Eros, the god, the bodily power, that 
he serves, not specific women or even women in general; and Eros, the god, is 
abandoning him. In the final chapter Rilke‟s famous injunction, “Du must dein 
Leben ändern!”: you must change your life, holds no appeal for him, is no 
longer relevant: “Well, he is too old to heed, too old to change. Lucy may be 
able to bend to the tempest, he cannot, not with honour” (209). Renunciation, in 
some form or other, is indeed the only response, a response forced on him 
rather than welcomed. Like Faust, Lurie cannot repent.6 
 
We are now in a position to explore the significance of the two key issues, 
Lurie‟s obsessive compassion and care for the expiring dogs; and why Lucy 
responds with such passivity, such resignation, such inertness, to her rape and 
her future on the South African smallholding. 
 
We have noted the disabling ambivalence in Kant‟s treatment of the noumenal: 
his presumption that discrete noumena are the causes of our perceptions, when 
on his own assumptions this is precisely something we can never know. There 
is a further implication here. If our apprehension of a thoroughly differentiated 
world is indeed caused by things-in-themselves, then the noumenal must itself 
consist of multiple „things-in-themselves‟. This is again problematic on Kant‟s 
own grounds: multiplicity can be experienced only in relation to conceptions of 
space and time, and these Kant had shown to be subject-bound forms of 
sensibility and reflection. It follows ineluctably that differentiation itself is 
confined to the world of experience; there can be no knowledge of „things-in-
themselves‟ independently of experience, as Kant had oddly assumed. The 
unknowable reality beyond all possibility of experience must be 
undifferentiated.  
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This powerful and mysterious move beyond Kant was taken by Schopenhauer,7 
and my contention in this essay is that the form of entsagen achieved 
consciously, if reluctantly, by David Lurie in Disgrace, and which is practiced 
unconsciously by his daughter, Lucy, moves beyond the famous teaching 
espoused by the German literary romantics. What Lurie discovers – and it is a 
discovery, not an intellectual insight – is the doctrine of entsagen as understood 
by Schopenhauer (see The World as Will and Representation i 378-398).  
 
Schopenhauer‟s Weltanschauung, achieved in the classical idiom of western 
philosophy, postulates an undifferentiated, immaterial, timeless, space-less, 
cognitively inaccessible noumenon which presents itself to our variant 
perceptual constitutions as this differentiated phenomenal world of material 
objects and events (including each of us) in space and time. The vision is to an 
extent congruent with that found in Vedic and Buddhist literature, something 
which impressed Schopenhauer enormously when he uncovered the parallels.8 
According to Schopenhauer – and here comes the major implication for 
Disgrace – the undifferentiatedness of the noumenal is crucial to understanding 
the basis of morality. 
 
In the phenomenal world we exist as separate embodied individuals, as 
gendered humans and animals – not to mention mollusks, plants, rock 
formations and so forth; but noumenally, in the ultimate ground of our being, it 
is impossible that we should be differentiated. In relation to this ultimate origin, 
we are one; differentiation cannot apply. It follows that if we hurt another 
being, in this special sense we hurt ourselves. This, for Schopenhauer, is the 
ultimate explanation of compassion, altruism, disinterested concern for others – 
of those ethical behaviors which would make no sense were we actually the 
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utterly separate beings our senses proclaim us to be. (One might question the 
epistemology here and still find the description telling in terms of moral 
awareness.) 
 
Schopenhauer maintains firmly that this basis of moral insight, which gives rise 
to the possibility of ethical behavior, “just because it is not abstract [in other 
words, because it does not belong to the world as representation], cannot be 
communicated, but must dawn on each of us. It therefore finds its real and 
adequate expression not in words, but simply and solely in deeds, in conduct, in 
the course of a man‟s [or woman‟s] life” (The World as Will and 
Representation i 370).9 Lucy seems to have this sense of things as a given. 
David Lurie‟s experience at the animal shelter, in tandem with his attempts to 
come to terms with Lucy‟s rape, suggests (though it cannot communicate) the 
ripening of a comparable moral awareness. He discovers first hand what no 
course in „communication‟, such as the one he is forced to teach at the Cape 
Technical University could ever convey; no discourse grounded in phenomenal 
knowledge, no interaction in which a subject grasps or is grasped by an object, 
no self trying to come to terms with an „other‟ can ever apprehend. Such a 
realization should modify at a deep level the adequacy of interpretive 
approaches that read the novel simply as a reaction to the Enlightenment 
project, or to the cult of sentimentalism, as a puzzling treatise in post-
coloniality, as an exercise in empirical realism, as a questioning of the 
possibility of ethical action – or any of several other responses derived from 
what, elsewhere, Coetzee wryly calls “the games handbook” (“The Novel 
Today”: 3-4).10 Lurie‟s unbearably moving apology to the Isaacs family, 
mother and younger daughter, after the awkward meal in George, portrays his 
brave effort to supply from their own cultural repertoire a symbolic gesture he 
hopes will convey a meaning they need from him: “With careful ceremony he 
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gets to his knees and touches his forehead to the floor”(173). The symbol has 
been offered; the meaning cannot be conveyed with any surety. But the gesture 
neither transcends nor negates the predicament of gendered sexuality: a few 
lines further we read, as he looks into the eyes of mother and daughter: “again 
the current leaps, the current of desire” (173).  
 
This retreat into silent symbolism may seem a simple cop-out. It isn‟t. Though 
we cannot know the noumenon as such, we know its manifestations, some 
beautiful, some terrible. The noumenon throws up earthquakes, hurricanes, 
tsunamis, fires, bestial ferocity. It engenders organic forms which persist for a 
while, and then retire to their noumenal source, returning and relapsing into 
energy like the dog‟s corpses in the hospital incinerator. The noumenon is 
undifferentiated elemental energy, existing beyond the phenomenal world, 
quite outside the reach of the senses or their conceptual extensions and 
therefore permanently unknowable. Through our senses we are aware of each 
other as discrete phenomenal beings and therefore as objects of knowledge. But 
– and this is crucial – we also experience ourselves from the inside, 
immediately. This latter experience is not one of knowledge (that belongs to the 
world of representation and the senses) but of pure physiological will. All 
emotions and feelings are modifications of the will, of the body experienced 
from inside. As Lurie puts it, “What does he know [my emphasis] of the force 
that drives the utmost strangers into each other‟s arms, making them kin, kind, 
beyond all prudence?” (194). 
 
It is through this unknowable experience of our own inner existence as 
embodied will that we are able to empathize with other human beings; with 
other animals, other life forms, and other material formations. His daughter 
tells Lurie, “This is the only life there is. Which we share with animals” (74). 
 20 
The stolid Lucy‟s Wordsworthian namesake may be “A perfect Woman, nobly 
planned” (Poems of the Imagination, VIII), but the poet must also come to 
contemplate her “Rolled round in earth‟s diurnal course/ With rocks and stones 
and trees” (Ibid., X). Lucy does not stay on at Salem “for an idea” (105). Her 
crucifixion-like cry, “But why did they hate me so?”(156), is her one 
concession to the world as representation. We cannot know the world as will, 
but we can experience its effects in ourselves. From that basis we can learn, if 
not compassion, at least a disconcerting empathy, even for rapists and other 
violators. The body‟s response to the god Eros is both willed (permitted by us) 
and not willed (fated, ensured by our biological makeup); and in ethical terms, 
eros is one of the noumenon‟s most powerfully contradictory manifestations.  
 
However, despite its aboriginal obscurity, according to Schopenhauer there is a 
medium through which we can have powerful if indirect access to the 
noumenon, where the world as will becomes intelligible, and that is through 
music. In his hierarchy of the arts, music is supreme; not only supreme, but of a 
different order. Unlike the other art forms, music bypasses the realm of 
representation (except in moments of weak mimesis, of which Schopenhauer 
disapproves) and speaks directly to and through our inner being. Through 
music, in this case his imaginatively evolving opera, Lurie‟s attachment to the 
world as representation eventually thins to the symbolic measure of a fishing 
line: 
He is in the opera neither as Teresa nor as Byron nor even as some 
blending of the two: he is held in the music itself, in the flat, tinny slap 
of the banjo strings, the voice that strains to soar away from the 
ludicrous instrument but is continually reigned back, like a fish on a line. 
 So this is art, he thinks, and this is how it does its work! How 
strange! How fascinating! 
(184-85) 
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By yielding up all investment in the world as representation; sacrificing any 
sense of himself as a physical being in the world, and therefore all possibility of 
relatedness (including, in Lurie‟s case, his sympathetic relationship with the 
little dog, Driepoot, his last attachment), Lurie achieves an accommodation 
with the world as will. The German word Lösung means something like 
„solution‟ or „resolution‟. Musically, in the course of the novel what had been 
conceived as a chamber opera (retaining elements of dramatic representation, 
the present tense) thins to a duet, a musical dialogue, between Teresa in her 
fifties and the shade of the dead Byron, and finally to a one-sided, all-absorbing 
„inner duet‟ in which Lurie hears only the music of Teresa. The pattern, both 
musical and epistemological, culminates in the perfective – “an action carried 
through to its conclusion” (71) – after the final period. It may not be the blissful 
vision anticipated by Richard of St. Victor („vision‟ here would be quite the 
wrong word). But it has its completeness, perhaps as a form of dis-grace.11 Just 
as Faust is finally absorbed by the „eternal feminine‟ (das Ewig-Weibliche) – 
the guise in which Lurie finally sees his daughter (see 218) – so David Lurie 
finds respite from the torment of gendered sexuality in relinquishing his 
physical being, upon which he can at least „hear‟, if not „know‟, the music of 
some kind of fullness.    
 
We should not mistake the scope of Coetzee‟s thought in this book. There are 
two traditions in western mythology concerning the rise of cities and 
civilizations. The visionary artists and heroes, such as Orpheus and Amphion, 
give rise to cities by means of music and eloquence.12 David Lurie is a latter-
day Orpheus, striving to hymn civilization into being, his modest chamber 
opera sadly reduced to the plonking of his daughter‟s banjo in the dog-yard at 
the animal shelter.  “His own opinion”, he tells us at the beginning of the novel, 
“- - - is that the origins of speech lie in song, and the origins of song in the need 
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to fill out with sound the overlarge and rather empty human soul” (2). The 
more powerful counter tradition, the tradition of Romulus and Cain, is that 
cities are founded or taken through cunning, treachery, siege and, yes, rape. 
Twins are fundamental to these foundation myths, a hint that the generative 
energy of the noumenon is ambivalent, if not downright amoral in its 
manifestations. Cain, the tiller of soil and builder of the first city, slew his 
brother Abel, the pastoralist; Romulus killed Remus and went on to found 
Rome and rape the Sabine women (as a youngster pondering the meaning of 
the word „rape‟, Lurie saw a reproduction of Poussin‟s painting of this episode 
in a library book – see 160). In Disgrace we have a young rapist with the 
curious name of Pollux, wittingly or not taking part in Petrus‟s ambiguous 
scheme to assume his rightful place in the new South African scheme of things. 
Castor and Pollux, the so-called „heavenly twins‟, symbolize in Chinese 
astrology the twin energies of Yin Yang. There should be a place in Disgrace 
for Castor, the more spiritually or intellectually-minded of the „heavenly twins‟. 
With terrible irony, the implication is that David Lurie, the artist-rapist, fits the 
bill. 
 
NOTES 
This paper was given as a plenary address at “Africa in Literature,” the 15th 
International Conference of the English Academy of Southern Africa in association with 
SAWA, AUETSA, SAWAL, and SAACLALS. Cape Town, University of Cape Town, 10-
13 July, 2005. 
 
1. Goethe‟s preoccupation with Byron, notably evident in the 
Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann, echoes David Lurie‟s own 
to a marked degree, as here: 
 
Goethe continued to talk of Lord Byron. “With that disposition,” 
said he, “which always leads him into the illimitable, the restraint 
he imposed upon himself by the observance of the three unities 
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becomes him. If he had but known how to endure moral restraint 
also! That he could not was his ruin; it may be said he was 
destroyed by his own unbridled temperament. 
 “But he was too much in the dark about himself, and 
neither knew nor thought what he was doing. Permitting 
everything to himself, and excusing nothing in others, he 
necessarily put himself in a bad position, and made the world his 
foe - - - - This reckless conduct drove him from England, and 
would in time have driven him from Europe also. Everywhere it 
was too narrow for him, with the most perfect personal freedom 
he felt confined; the world seemed a prison. His Grecian 
expedition was the result of no voluntary resolution; his 
misunderstanding with the world drove him to it.    
         (88) 
2. The second is on page 89. 
3. Later Lurie reminds Lucy of the Blakean adage from The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell, “Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse 
unacted desires” (69). 
 
4. A telling vernacular definition of the Latin Affectio, as used by 
Cicero, appears in Cooper‟s Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et 
Britannicae (1578 ed.) as follows: 
 
Affectio, Verbale. Cic.  
Affection: a disposition or mutation happening to bouie or minde: 
trouble of minde. Impetus, commotion, affectioque animi. 
 
5. Perhaps it might be more accurate to term the novel „anti (i.e. 
„against‟) pastoral‟ rather than an anti-pastoral in the sense of its 
reversing the pastoral conventions. Despite the odd reference to 
process (e.g. “Inexorably, he thinks, the country is coming to the 
city” – 175), Disgrace is more obviously dedicated to dismantling the 
pastoral than to subverting it. The city is no refuge from the country. 
 
6. “It is one of the laws of Faust‟s titanic nature that he should be 
incapable of repentance in the ordinary sense of the word” (Mason 
319). 
 
7. See especially the Appendix on the “Criticism of Kantian 
Philosophy” in The World as Will and Representation i 413-534. 
Coetzee‟s preoccupation with Schopenhauer is enacted in Disgrace 
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rather than cited; but The Lives of Animals (1999?) and Elizabeth 
Costello (2003) are shot though with Schopenhauerian thought and 
feeling, as in Elizabeth Costello‟s discussion of Hughes‟s poems on 
the jaguar in the latter work: “In these poems we know the jaguar not 
from the way he seems but from the way he moves” (95). The 
publication dates of the two books, one before Disgrace, the other 
after, suggest that Coetzee‟s thought was running in these trammels 
while work on the novel was in progress. 
 
8. For an intimation of this strain of thought in Schopenhauer‟s earliest 
work see On The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
185-189. 
 
9. I have kept to E.J.F. Payne‟s rendering of the title of Schopenhauer‟s 
principle work, but the following comment by Konstantin Kolenda is 
worth noting: “The original German title Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung was rendered by the translator as The World as Will and 
Representation, in preference to Haldane and Kemp‟s The World as 
Will and Idea. As Professor D.W. Hamlyn pointed out, the use of 
„representation‟ in place of „idea‟ is less misleading but not altogether 
felicitous; he suggested that perhaps a more neutral term, such as 
„presentation‟, would come closer to what Schopenhauer meant by 
Vorstellung” (v). 
 
10. A small selection of relevant work would be Taylor (1999), Marais 
(2000), Graham (2002), Attwell (2001, 2002), and Cornwell (2002). 
 
11. I am grateful to Professor Ron Hall of Rhodes University for this 
insight. 
 
12. The tradition of Orpheus and Amphion is well summarized by Vico 
in his oration „On the Proper Order of Studies‟(1707): 
For no other reason, the very wise poets created their poetic fables 
of Orpheus with his lyre taming the wild animals and Amphion 
with his song able to move the stones, which arranged themselves 
of their own accord by his music, thus erecting the walls of 
Thebes. For their feats, the lyre of the one and the dolphin of the 
other have been hurled into the heavens and are seen among the 
stars. Those rocks, those oaken planks, those wild animals are the 
fools among men. Orpheus and Amphion are the wise who have 
brought together by means of their eloquence the knowledge of 
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things divine and human and have led isolated man into union, 
that is, from love of self to the fostering of human community, 
from sluggishness to purposeful activity, from unrestrained 
license to compliance with law, and by conferring equal rights 
united those unbridled in their strength with the weak. 
(130-31) 
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